both the Secretary and the Indians—were gleefully re-echoed by the real enemies of reform. And a strong opposition beset Mr. Schurz at every step in his efforts to improve the administration's Indian policy.

The chief problems inherited from the Grant regime were connected with the disturbances in the plains and mountains of the far West. Railway building, mine opening, and the rapid progress of settlement by the whites had completely transformed the conditions of Indian life. All the tribes, even the largest and most far-ranging, were forced to be content with relatively narrow reservations, and to look to the government for supplies with which to eke out the ever-diminishing product of the chase. To keep the restless and unruly tribesmen on their reservations and the no less unruly white men off, was a task frequently beyond the powers of the agents, and the army had to be appealed to. In view of repeated bloody conflicts, culminating in the slaughter of Custer and his command by the Sioux in the summer of 1876, a feeling had gained wide prevalence that a total change of policy was necessaiy. Under President Grant religious and philanthropic societies and individuals had been formally endowed with consultative and advisory functions in the management of Indian affairs, with the idea of promoting civilization on the reservations. The " peace policy " represented by this system was now declared by many to be a hopeless failure, and it was

urged that the management of the Indians should be taken entirely out of the hands of the Department of the Interior and given to the War Department. Since the army had ultimately to come in and settle all the serious issues that arose, it would be better in every sense, so the argument ran, that the whole situation be under military control from the outset. Generals Sherman and bhendan strongly advocated this view, and it was urged by